After the Surge: The Future of Afghanistan
A cash for co-operation scheme to entice Taliban insurgents away from militancy, and a timeframe for the transfer of security control to Afghan forces were the centre pieces of ‘Afghanistan: The London Conference’ on January 28th. President Karzai, Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the UN, were joined by a delegation from the Afghan government and foreign policy representatives from the 43-nation security coalition. Together they committed $140 million to support the Afghan government’s Peace and Reintegration Programme, and announced that Afghan forces would take charge of the country’s security arrangements within the next five years.
An attempt to divide the majority of moderate Taliban from their extremist core, the reintegration programme will offer money and jobs to militants prepared to join peace talks and accept the Afghan constitution. Although reconciliation with the Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, is considered unlikely, other Taliban officials may well be brought to the table to discuss power sharing options, their previous war crimes and human rights violations put to one side in hope of bringing near-term stability.
The current courtship of Taliban fighters is a far cry from 2001 when the rescue of Afghanistan’s women from the terrors of Taliban rule was presented as the primary reason for invasion by foreign forces. Today, the Taliban are no longer the unquestioned enemies of democracy, western values and the Afghan people but, in President Karzai’s own words, “our disenchanted brothers”. The political rhetoric has changed and, say civil society groups, it is not for the better.
“Reintegration cannot be the first step,” says Orzala Ashraf, founder of Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan and advisor to UNIFEM. “First we must negotiate, then reconcile, and only then can there be reintegration.”
Many groups fear that an amnesty for the Taliban will undermine people’s trust in the government as it contradicts their commitment to rule of law, a lynch-pin in their bid for legitimacy, and undermines the international community’s previous emphasis on the importance human rights. The policy will sit uncomfortably with those who feel an accountable, capable and responsible government in Kabul is Afghanistan’s best hope for long-term stability, and pressure will also be applied to the donor states by those questioning the logic of deploying troops against the Taliban at the same time as renting their loyalty.
In what has been seen as a concrete step towards improved security, Gordon Brown pledged support for the expansion of the Afghan National Army to 171,600 men by October 2011, and the eventual expansion of the national police force to 134,000. Whether or not these forces will include former Taliban members brought in through the Peace and Reintegration Programme has not been publicly discussed. It is hoped that the increase in manpower, funded by the security coalition and trained by NATO forces, will enable the Afghan government to take control of national security by 2015. The hand-over of provinces could begin from as early as the end of this year, although President Karzai has hinted that Afghanistan may require foreign financial support for its security forces for as long as 15 years.
Brown’s description of the new policies as a “civilian surge” has not gone without criticism, however. A series of development-focused conferences has run alongside the main event in an attempt to compensate for the complete exclusion of women and civil society representatives from the main Afghan delegation. Much of the promised aid, including $1 billion from the US government, is to be deployed by military forces, muddying the line between military and humanitarian assistance. Eight international aid organisations including Oxfam, Action Aid and Afghan Aid, have raised concern that the military’s association with construction projects makes them a target for armed opposition groups, effectively putting civilian recipients of aid on the frontline of the conflict.
The message of the London Conference is clear: the international community will support the Afghan government with both funds and manpower, and believes that economic and humanitarian intervention must go hand in hand with military strategy if Afghanistan is to regain stability. The challenge comes, however, in balancing short-term security objectives and political interests with sustainable development, respect for the rule of law, and participatory democracy. If a path can be found that in the future enables the Afghan people to respect, trust and hold accountable a government capable of independently maintaining national security, adhering to principles of good governance and honouring its international obligations, we will know that ‘Afghanistan: The London Conference’ has been a slightly confused but ultimately positive step forward on the long road to peace and stability.
Sophie Ibbotson
