Iran – a diplomatic tightrope
Friday, November 20th, 2009
One of the most intriguing or worrying countries – depending on your point of view – which can be found along Tracing Tea’s route is Iran. On our television screens, the Islamic Republic of Iran has again been in the limelight over its nuclear programme. There a three competing views. The West – Israel and America in particular – strongly suspect Iran’s continuing enrichment of uranium is aimed at developing a nuclear weapon. Iran, for its part, strongly denies this, accuses the West of double standards (‘if Brazil can, why can’t we?’) and, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, emphasises its ‘inaliable right’ to pursue peaceful nuclear power. Finally, Russia and China defend Iran’s nuclear ambitions and act as a brake on the West’s more ‘proactive’ approach to the issue. Why are Russia and China interested in taking Iran’s point of view? The answer is, put simply, there is much to play for. Indeed, due to its geographic position and its resources, Iran has always found itself being pulled one way or the other between the objectives and power-politics of regional players: between Russia and Britain during the Great Game and again during WWII; between Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the Taleban of Afghanistan (Iran’s leaders rejoiced in their removal, in the case of Afghanistan, actually offered to help). In a modern context, China sees in Iran a country which, on the one hand, has very little or no economic ties with Europe or America but, on the other, has areas in which Chinese expertise could play a profitable role – telecommunications, highways and public transport infrastructure and sadly, of course, internet censorship. Then there is Russia, badly hit by the financial crisis, and keen to maintain and – if possible expand – its valuable commercial contracts in Iran, in their case providing military hardware and building the Bushehr power plant.
A short history of Bushehr
Previously a quiet backwater known only for its unique folk music, Bushehr was selected in the 1970s (under the Shah) as a site for a nuclear powe plant. The reason was quite simple: it was (and is) one of the few locations in Iran not in an earthquake zone. The plant was initially developed by a subsidiary of the German company Siemens. Following the Islamic Revolution however, Siemens abruptly ceased to cooperate with the project and French company Eurodief, who were contracted to provide the enriched uranium for the plant, declined to do so, despite the fact that Iran had already paid for some. Here we have the roots of the present enrichment crisis: the withdrawal by Europe, in the words of Iran’s last nuclear negotiator, Dr Ali Larijani, ’caused our mistrust towards the west and encouraged us to go for the completion of our own peaceful nuclear program.’
Iran still needed a partner, however. Fast forward eight years, past the long and traumatic Iran-Iraq war, and negotiations for the project were re-opened under the government of then Prime Minister Hossein Mousavi (incidentally the same Mousavi who lost out to Ahmadinejad in the rigged election of July 2009.) This time, the assistance of Russia was to replace that of France and Germany. The resulting $800 million deal, signed in January 1995, allowed for the supply of three 1000MW light-water reactors and associated technological assistance. Under this scheme, the plant was to be completed by Iranian engineers, with Russian expertise and guidance. In 1998 however, with the project still crawling along, it was decided to draft in large contingent of Russian engineers to speed up proceedings. If one considers therefore Russian jobs created, both directly and indirectly, as a result of the Bushehr deal and indeed by Russia’s wider nuclear and military assistance to Iran, it is hardly surprising that Russia consistently vetoes UN Security Council resolutions to impose punitive measures on Iran. Russia’s intrasigence was underlined recently (September 2009) by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s fruitless attempt to persuade President Medyedev to agree to sanctions on Iran. That US pleas should again fall on deaf ears is no discredit to Mrs Clinton; it is worth remembering that one of her predecessors in the 1990s, Al Gore, went much further and effectively tried to bribe Russia out of cooperating with Iran. However, because the compensation to Russia proposed by the Clinton administration (30$ million) was pretty derisory when compared to the value of the contract ($800 million), the effort to dissuade the Yeltsin administration from cooperation with Iran, of course, met very little success.
The Bushehr plant was originally due to be completed in 2007 and, as things are, looks scheduled to go operational in 2010. For the Russians, it is imperative to get the plant up and running as soon as possible, and not bow to European and American pressure on sanctions. Russia sees Bushehr effectively as a storefront for its nuclear industry, allowing it to present itself internationally as an reliable nuclear partner, which delivers on its commitments and does not bend to international pressure. In this regard, Atomstroyexport – the Russian state-controlled conglomerate behind the Bushehr plant – has its eye firmly fixed on the growth of demand for nuclear power in India and China, where it already has a number of projects. To put it simply, Russian withdrawal from Iran’s nuclear industry, even in view of disagreements with the West over uranium enrichment, would not only damage Russia’s commercial reputation but also marr its carefully cultivated relations with Iran’s government and, in consequence, seriously dent the profits of major Russian companies. It was surely for this reason that president Vladimir Putin, visiting Tehran in October 2007, was swift to attribute delays in the project to ‘legal and financial difficulties’ rather than to international politics.
Iran, for its part, highly values Russia’s involvement. The nuclear industry in Iran has emerged as symbol of national pride, one of Iranian nationalism’s central articles of faith. One finds that Iranians from a broad variety of backgrounds and ages, many of who are deeply resentful of their present government, will nevertheless passionately defend Iran’s right to nuclear technology. Setting nuclear development aside however, Russia – and China – play a more fundamental role in Iran’s position on the international stage. Iran, by balancing the concerns of the one side (US, Europe, Israel) against the vested interests of the other (Russia, China), allows itself to maintain a useful equilibrium. And Iran’s diplomats, long-standing maestros of the international balancing act, will surely do their best to ensure that, as in the past, Iran will continue to get its own way in future.
Michael Pye








